Here is a link to the Rainier incident. Like you... perhaps... I think each of these on their own could be taken differently than when you look at the pattern of incidents and in this case a tragic outcome as well. There is more to learn from them and preventing future events than what is currently occurring. Unfortunately on Rainier there was an extremely close call in similar circumstances (better acclimation or even additional safety gear like screws for V-treads may have been beneficial), but thankfully a better outcome.
While I agree that one can always improve what one does for next time, the situation that happened on Ptarmigan Ridge could have happened to anyone. I heard that she has been to 14,000 feet numerous times and has climbed Rainier before. So it sounds like to me the only major mistake was her not going up Rainier with a full overnight pack and perhaps some other addition to establish if she was worthy (via a not as technical route). Most do not do this which is why I don't blame Mark. To prevent incidents like that one, one must be conscious of not only all the variables, but be conscious of them all at once. Mark knew how serious it was to get her down which is why he kept pushing her to proceed. I'm sure he had the Shasta incident on his conscious and wanted to make sure it never happened again. I've learned a ton in my years of climbing but unpredictable events keep coming my way. But the good news is I have dodged a lot of issues because of them.
What I do enjoy about discussions like this is that it gets us to look deeper into the facts and think critically for our own future adventures. I just hope that we do it without being too harsh on one another. Someone once told me that a great mountaineer is not just someone who learns from his own mistakes, but of others. I think it's great that Mark has went into lengths of efforts to put this together and in hopes that some of us might take something away from this. In my opinion this is one of the greatest pieces of mountaineering literature posted on SP.
I often do regular check ups on how my partners are doing. I know this is a bit harder on climbs, but should be exercised where ever possible when dealing with dangerous and hard climbs. But I do admit there are some trips I don't, but often those cases are at low altitude (below 7,000 feet). So Mark, my advise with future postings is to give advise on what you could have done better. Even if you did better than 95% other mountaineers. This will demonstrate to the public that you are more than willing to improve yourself for future climbs and give advise to those who missed the subtle details.
I was sad when I read this story years ago, knowing how horrible it must of been being near the top of the mountain in the storm. I'm glad you survived it. I'm grateful for you sharing the story and am sure Tom would be proud that you stood by his side at the edge of the world when things went terrible.
I have wanted to stay off of this TR to let things lie as they may, but I have been dismayed at the overall turn of comments being a place to judge as 'holier than thou', and a perfect place for Chad to continue his character assassinations of me (which are not worth my time to really engage in. He, and the people he influences, DO NOT matter to me. Those I interact with, do.). The latest comment has me feeling like inaction is doing a disservice to the intent of this piece, which I wrote due to the request of others feeling something useful could still be presented.
A problem for me as far as the 'doing better' department in this case is that the answers I came away with were either to stay way farther away from the mountains out of fear, only venturing in during ideal and predictable conditions specified by other sources/people rather than my own assessments and attempts to learn to live in the gray areas, or realizing that #$*^ happens, and sometimes it happens to you and there's nothing you can do about it. Which is one reason I find it so angering when people say that I am not pointing out some magical ingredient that would have prevented this apart from a gross avoidance of the contributing factors (key word being contributing factors), or that because I have had run-ins with these things multiple times and mentioned them publicly, that I am at fault, even if in each situation the characters and victim is different. I can say that some of my detractors (such as Chad), have had their own close calls but have kept them private and been unwilling to discuss them, lest is taint their 'perfection' while on their podiums of judgement (BTW, he has made it clear that he supported me initially but only switched positions because I called him out on being insensitive to another mountaineering death. Ask him about the 'Wombat death bivvies' he and his friends joke about when they aren't pretending to present sound arguments publicly that they know I am tired of re-hashing. Really screwed up and manipulative, IMO).
I still doubt the HACE outcome would have been different regardless of conditions, and the conditions merely set up the scene. Tom and I had planned other excursions that would have put us in similar situations, that high altitude experts had told me later were not unreasonable (but not risk-free, either).
So for me, personally, while I am at peace morally, I am not at all at peace with the actual events. I do not see this as a piece saying I did everything perfectly and nothing could have prevented this. I still think things went terribly. The best I could see to do (which would have had no effect here, but at last in other foreseeable situations), was to get my WFR training and keep it current, and insist strongly to climbing partners that they do so as well, as such training can avoid preventable fatalities and permanent injuries in many common mountaineering and trad climbing outings. Same goes for Avy I training and recerts. Beyond that, it is just that for me, personally, I readjust some expectations on how things can go wrong and how I can actually handle them without more people to support the situation - which has made me more conservative in my climbing and ever-less trusting of partners and what they say to me - especially with less experienced partners.
An effective piece. Well worth the reading and a great cautionary bit of prose.
When I found last year that I begin to get sick when I break 11,500 feet (or so) I realized that I probably should stay away from the higher peaks. This reinforces that for me.
What a beautiful commemoration for your friend, Mark.
I regret that the rampant sensationalistic, morbid, and voyeuristic scum so pervasive in modern society led you to feel the need to write this article. You shouldn't have had to explain like this, although I'm glad that you had the strength to do so - you should have been allowed to grieve and heal in private.
Having said that - I rejoice with you in the rare gift of deep companionship you shared with Tom, and then shared with the rest of us so movingly.
Good points, but I question your statement "Even your 9,800' camp is pushing it for most people". While it might be difficult for a lot of folks, it's not uncommon. Camp Muir on Rainier is lightly over 10,000 feet, many including myself go up from sea level to it on the same day to camp.
I'm an old Shasta guide who's climbed that rubble pile more times than I can remember. I know the whitney glacier basin pretty damn well. Perhaps Mark himself can tell us why it is that, if they summited at 6:30pm as he said, his photograph of the upper Whitney basin shows the shadows coming from the ridge to the right of the upper cirque coming all the way to the transverse rock ledge at the head of the cirque. There is a 200 ft elevation difference between that ridgeline and that rockband, and approximately 1100 feet of horiontal distance between them. Doing the trig, this gives us a known, verifiable solar angle of less than 15 degrees at the time the photo was taken. Using NOAA's solar calculator for that date and shasta's coordinates, we can determine that the sun, on that date, sank below 15 degrees at just about 6pm. Therefore, we know that that picture was taken at approximately or even a little after 6pm, daylight savings time. Daylight savings time that year started march 14th, ~2 weeks previous to tom's fatality. In other words, in order for them to have summited at 6:30, as Mark claims, they would have had to climb just shy of 1700 feet in 30 minutes, from approximately 12,500, (where the pic was taken), to 14,180 feet in that time, after all else that they had done in the previous 2 days. I can tell you from decades of fast alpine soloing, numerous denali laps, and dozens and dozens of laps on shasta that nobody with a full pack on, slowed down by rope and partner, after post holing up a glacier all day in winter conditions, can perform that feat. Not Ueli Steck, not anybody. The July 2012 speed record holder on shasta was climbing approximately 73 vertical feet per minute, unfettered by any gear but a racing axe. Mark's claim is that, after postholing and ice climbing all day, carrying full packs, they were cranking 56 feet per minute up that final gulley and on to the summit. 75% of the speed of a full out race pace world class sprint. Wrong, Mark. There are many, many other logical inconsistencies in Mark's "tale". This one about the shadows and the summit time claim just stands out as one of the most logically flawed, and simultaneously easiest to debunk, of the many, many flaws and inconsistencies in his story.
Mark,
Thank you for sharing the story of what happened on Shasta. The media blows chunks... it blows Barney's giant purple wiener. You and Tom both have integrity, commitment to doing right, You did everything that could have been humanly done. I hope you are at peace. I know Tom is. Any time I look up at that big old volcano I'll remember. May you be happy, May you be well. e
mrchad9 - May 14, 2013 12:26 pm - Hasn't voted
Re: Sad...Here is a link to the Rainier incident. Like you... perhaps... I think each of these on their own could be taken differently than when you look at the pattern of incidents and in this case a tragic outcome as well. There is more to learn from them and preventing future events than what is currently occurring. Unfortunately on Rainier there was an extremely close call in similar circumstances (better acclimation or even additional safety gear like screws for V-treads may have been beneficial), but thankfully a better outcome.
Here is another earlier incident, and there are lower profile events.
Josh Lewis - May 14, 2013 8:49 pm - Voted 10/10
Re: Sad...While I agree that one can always improve what one does for next time, the situation that happened on Ptarmigan Ridge could have happened to anyone. I heard that she has been to 14,000 feet numerous times and has climbed Rainier before. So it sounds like to me the only major mistake was her not going up Rainier with a full overnight pack and perhaps some other addition to establish if she was worthy (via a not as technical route). Most do not do this which is why I don't blame Mark. To prevent incidents like that one, one must be conscious of not only all the variables, but be conscious of them all at once. Mark knew how serious it was to get her down which is why he kept pushing her to proceed. I'm sure he had the Shasta incident on his conscious and wanted to make sure it never happened again. I've learned a ton in my years of climbing but unpredictable events keep coming my way. But the good news is I have dodged a lot of issues because of them.
What I do enjoy about discussions like this is that it gets us to look deeper into the facts and think critically for our own future adventures. I just hope that we do it without being too harsh on one another. Someone once told me that a great mountaineer is not just someone who learns from his own mistakes, but of others. I think it's great that Mark has went into lengths of efforts to put this together and in hopes that some of us might take something away from this. In my opinion this is one of the greatest pieces of mountaineering literature posted on SP.
I often do regular check ups on how my partners are doing. I know this is a bit harder on climbs, but should be exercised where ever possible when dealing with dangerous and hard climbs. But I do admit there are some trips I don't, but often those cases are at low altitude (below 7,000 feet). So Mark, my advise with future postings is to give advise on what you could have done better. Even if you did better than 95% other mountaineers. This will demonstrate to the public that you are more than willing to improve yourself for future climbs and give advise to those who missed the subtle details.
I was sad when I read this story years ago, knowing how horrible it must of been being near the top of the mountain in the storm. I'm glad you survived it. I'm grateful for you sharing the story and am sure Tom would be proud that you stood by his side at the edge of the world when things went terrible.
Thanks Mark, and God Bless.
PellucidWombat - Feb 1, 2016 3:30 am - Hasn't voted
Re: Sad...I have wanted to stay off of this TR to let things lie as they may, but I have been dismayed at the overall turn of comments being a place to judge as 'holier than thou', and a perfect place for Chad to continue his character assassinations of me (which are not worth my time to really engage in. He, and the people he influences, DO NOT matter to me. Those I interact with, do.). The latest comment has me feeling like inaction is doing a disservice to the intent of this piece, which I wrote due to the request of others feeling something useful could still be presented.
A problem for me as far as the 'doing better' department in this case is that the answers I came away with were either to stay way farther away from the mountains out of fear, only venturing in during ideal and predictable conditions specified by other sources/people rather than my own assessments and attempts to learn to live in the gray areas, or realizing that #$*^ happens, and sometimes it happens to you and there's nothing you can do about it. Which is one reason I find it so angering when people say that I am not pointing out some magical ingredient that would have prevented this apart from a gross avoidance of the contributing factors (key word being contributing factors), or that because I have had run-ins with these things multiple times and mentioned them publicly, that I am at fault, even if in each situation the characters and victim is different. I can say that some of my detractors (such as Chad), have had their own close calls but have kept them private and been unwilling to discuss them, lest is taint their 'perfection' while on their podiums of judgement (BTW, he has made it clear that he supported me initially but only switched positions because I called him out on being insensitive to another mountaineering death. Ask him about the 'Wombat death bivvies' he and his friends joke about when they aren't pretending to present sound arguments publicly that they know I am tired of re-hashing. Really screwed up and manipulative, IMO).
I still doubt the HACE outcome would have been different regardless of conditions, and the conditions merely set up the scene. Tom and I had planned other excursions that would have put us in similar situations, that high altitude experts had told me later were not unreasonable (but not risk-free, either).
So for me, personally, while I am at peace morally, I am not at all at peace with the actual events. I do not see this as a piece saying I did everything perfectly and nothing could have prevented this. I still think things went terribly. The best I could see to do (which would have had no effect here, but at last in other foreseeable situations), was to get my WFR training and keep it current, and insist strongly to climbing partners that they do so as well, as such training can avoid preventable fatalities and permanent injuries in many common mountaineering and trad climbing outings. Same goes for Avy I training and recerts. Beyond that, it is just that for me, personally, I readjust some expectations on how things can go wrong and how I can actually handle them without more people to support the situation - which has made me more conservative in my climbing and ever-less trusting of partners and what they say to me - especially with less experienced partners.
BobSmith - May 14, 2013 12:15 pm - Voted 10/10
Well written.An effective piece. Well worth the reading and a great cautionary bit of prose.
When I found last year that I begin to get sick when I break 11,500 feet (or so) I realized that I probably should stay away from the higher peaks. This reinforces that for me.
lsheen - May 14, 2013 9:59 pm - Hasn't voted
Thank you, Mark.What a beautiful commemoration for your friend, Mark.
I regret that the rampant sensationalistic, morbid, and voyeuristic scum so pervasive in modern society led you to feel the need to write this article. You shouldn't have had to explain like this, although I'm glad that you had the strength to do so - you should have been allowed to grieve and heal in private.
Having said that - I rejoice with you in the rare gift of deep companionship you shared with Tom, and then shared with the rest of us so movingly.
Thank you.
Big Lew
radson - May 18, 2013 10:00 am - Voted 10/10
Re: Thank you, Mark.Great comments Big Lew
Josh Lewis - May 20, 2013 10:56 pm - Voted 10/10
Re: Contributing factorsGood points, but I question your statement "Even your 9,800' camp is pushing it for most people". While it might be difficult for a lot of folks, it's not uncommon. Camp Muir on Rainier is lightly over 10,000 feet, many including myself go up from sea level to it on the same day to camp.
chris_r - Nov 6, 2013 7:39 pm - Hasn't voted
Logical inconsistenciesI'm an old Shasta guide who's climbed that rubble pile more times than I can remember. I know the whitney glacier basin pretty damn well. Perhaps Mark himself can tell us why it is that, if they summited at 6:30pm as he said, his photograph of the upper Whitney basin shows the shadows coming from the ridge to the right of the upper cirque coming all the way to the transverse rock ledge at the head of the cirque. There is a 200 ft elevation difference between that ridgeline and that rockband, and approximately 1100 feet of horiontal distance between them. Doing the trig, this gives us a known, verifiable solar angle of less than 15 degrees at the time the photo was taken. Using NOAA's solar calculator for that date and shasta's coordinates, we can determine that the sun, on that date, sank below 15 degrees at just about 6pm. Therefore, we know that that picture was taken at approximately or even a little after 6pm, daylight savings time. Daylight savings time that year started march 14th, ~2 weeks previous to tom's fatality. In other words, in order for them to have summited at 6:30, as Mark claims, they would have had to climb just shy of 1700 feet in 30 minutes, from approximately 12,500, (where the pic was taken), to 14,180 feet in that time, after all else that they had done in the previous 2 days. I can tell you from decades of fast alpine soloing, numerous denali laps, and dozens and dozens of laps on shasta that nobody with a full pack on, slowed down by rope and partner, after post holing up a glacier all day in winter conditions, can perform that feat. Not Ueli Steck, not anybody. The July 2012 speed record holder on shasta was climbing approximately 73 vertical feet per minute, unfettered by any gear but a racing axe. Mark's claim is that, after postholing and ice climbing all day, carrying full packs, they were cranking 56 feet per minute up that final gulley and on to the summit. 75% of the speed of a full out race pace world class sprint. Wrong, Mark. There are many, many other logical inconsistencies in Mark's "tale". This one about the shadows and the summit time claim just stands out as one of the most logically flawed, and simultaneously easiest to debunk, of the many, many flaws and inconsistencies in his story.
gemminer - Jan 28, 2016 12:18 am - Hasn't voted
Thank you for postingMark,
Thank you for sharing the story of what happened on Shasta. The media blows chunks... it blows Barney's giant purple wiener. You and Tom both have integrity, commitment to doing right, You did everything that could have been humanly done. I hope you are at peace. I know Tom is. Any time I look up at that big old volcano I'll remember. May you be happy, May you be well. e